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THE HURRICANE KATRINA LITIGATION AGAINST THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS: IS DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
THE WAY TO SAVE NEW ORLEANS?
Edward P. Richards, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
The movie Rashomon presents the story of an event from the
perspective of four storytellers. Depending on the point of view, the event
could be a murder and rape or a battle of honor over a woman.1 Legal
scholars have made much of the Rashomon Effect as an example of the
ambiguity of truth and the effect of a person’s involvement in an event on
the person’s view of the event.2 The story of Hurricane Katrina echoes
Rashomon but includes many more unreliable narrators. The media story is
of failed emergency response by a feckless Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) director and an uninvolved president. Social justice
advocates tell of race discrimination and the right to return. New Orleans
politicians and land developers tell of a city-owned endless federal support
and protection because it has been sacrificed for navigation on the
Mississippi River. Environmentalists tell of a paradise destroyed by the oil
and gas industry,3 a paradise which can be restored if someone will just give
Louisiana enough money.4 This article analyzes the story told by plaintiffs’
*

This article is an expansion of the essay, Edward P. Richards, The Hurricane Katrina Levee
Breach Litigation: Getting the First Geoengineering Liability Case Right, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 267 (2012); For additional information on climate change, the Mississippi
Delta, and the Katrina litigation, see LSU LAW CENTER: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW & POLICY
PROJECT, https://sites.law.lsu.edu/coast/.
1. Rashomon (Daiei Motion Picture Co. Ltd. 1950).
2. David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of
Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 969, 981 (1991); see also Orit
Kamir, Judgment by Film: Socio-Legal Functions of Rashomon, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 39
(2000); Anthony Fassano, The Rashomon Effect, Jury Instructions, and Peremptory
Challenges: Rethinking Hernandez v. New York, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 783 (2009).
3. Oliver A. Houck, The Reckoning: Oil and Gas Development in the Louisiana
Coastal Zone, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 185 (2015). This cri de cœur is a brilliant history of
Louisiana as a third world petro state, dominated by oil companies and corrupt politicians,
resulting in stunted public institutions and a weak educational system.
4. See generally COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2012), http://coastal.la.gov/2012coastal-master-plan/; David Batker et al., The Importance of Mississippi Delta Restoration on
the Local and National Economies, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESTORATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DELTA 141 (2014), http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789401787321.
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lawyers and federal judges in three litigation threads against the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). In this story, New Orleans was
flooded by the Corps through its knowingly negligent levee construction.5
Each Katrina story has a grain of truth. All stories are variations on the
myth that New Orleans can be restored to a cultural and environmental
golden age. In each story, the golden age was stolen by a boogeyman who
owes reparations because New Orleans cannot be expected to pay its own
way.6 The boogeyman can be the oil industry,7 the Corps, FEMA, or an
uncaring Congress. Each story is fatally incomplete. For example, it is true
that if the levees had held and been tall enough, Hurricane Katrina would
have caused much less damage. But long-term studies of levees show that
they are never strong enough and tall enough to eliminate all risk.8 Levees
are always a compromise between money, land to build them on, and
aesthetics.9 They trade high frequency, low severity events for low
frequency, high severity events.10 The result is a public surprised by
catastrophic losses because people become convinced that the levees
5. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707 (2016), where a fourth
litigation thread awarded damages based on a temporary taking by flooding as recognized in
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). St. Bernard (Fed. Cl.)
accepted the record in the Robinson case, thus incorporating the same junk science on the
effects of the MRGO. The Federal Circuit reversed this takings finding in St. Bernard Par.
Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), finding that, had there been a taking,
the damages would have had to have been set off against the value of the flood control
system. Since most of the plaintiffs would be underwater without the flood control system,
and the rest also benefited from the flood control system, there were no damages and thus no
taking.
6. One might argue that Blanche DuBois stands in for New Orleans: “I have always
depended on the kindness of strangers.” Blanche DuBois, TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A
STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE sc. 11, 165 (New Directions ed., 1947); “I don’t want realism. I
want magic!” Blanche DuBois, TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE sc. 9,
135 (New Directions ed., 1947).
7. There are two threads of litigation against the oil and gas industry for destroying
wetlands, with the prayer for relief asking for huge restoration projects: Bd. of Comm’rs of
Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth. E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, No. CA 13-5410, 2015 WL
631348 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2015) and Parish of Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Ref.
USA, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 3d 872 (E.D. La. 2014) (one of many identical suits against different
defendant oil exploration companies).
8. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, SO, YOU LIVE BEHIND A LEVEE!: WHAT YOU SHOULD
KNOW TO PROTECT YOUR HOME AND LOVED ONES FROM FLOODS 18 (2009) (The post-Katrina
levees around New Orleans are designed to protect against a 100-year storm. That means
there is a 26% change that they will fail during a 30-year mortgage.).
9. Even if the federal government was willing to put up the money, would New Orleans
have tolerated having the city cut into sections by levees hundreds of feet wide and 40 feet
tall, making the city look like a series of isolated prison camps?
10. See Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). The reports that lead to the
Flood Control Act of 1928 stressed this tradeoff of risks, which was recognized in the Act by
Section 702, the immunity provision that is at the heart of all the cases against the Corps.
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eliminate all risk and thus attract more development. This is called the
“levee effect.”11 If there truly are boogeymen, it is the local officials who
allow risky development and do not properly prepare for disasters.12
Congress is also complicit by providing the funds to build the levees and to
subsidize flood insurance that allows flooded properties to be rebuilt in the
same place.
The false premise that underlies all the stories is the assumption that
New Orleans is on a steady state earth, unaffected by geology and climate
change. Both climate change and geology have a common path to disaster
for New Orleans: increasing relative sea level, i.e., the combination of sea
level rising from global warming and the loss of elevation from the
subsiding delta.13 Small changes in sea level are critical because the
Mississippi delta is very flat.14 Areas inside levees sink even faster50% of
New Orleans is already below sea level. Elevation, or the lack of it, is fatal
because Louisiana is hit by a hurricane on average every 2.8 years.15 Global
warming will make these storms stronger.16 These risks make New Orleans
an interesting story in itself, but it is also an exemplar of other high-risk
delta cities.17 Many Asian population centers are on deltas, and they face the
same deadly mix of sea level rise, subsidence, and deadly tropical
cyclones.18 How the United States manages the long-term threat to New
11. Byron Newberry, Katrina: Macro-ethical issues for engineers, 16 SCI. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS 535, 557–58 (2010) (This is a special case of the general “safe
development paradox.”); see also Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the paradoxes
of government disaster policy: Bringing about wise governmental decisions for hazardous
areas, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2006).
12. Burby, supra note 11, at 171 (“The local government paradox is that while their
citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, local officials pay
insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability.”).
13. Large hurricanes just ride on top of relative sea level rise (RSLR) because they put
everything underwater. But the effect in smaller storms is dramatic: “In wetland or wetlandfronted areas of moderate peak surges (2–3m), the surge levels were increased by as much as
1–3m (above the RSLR) for the RSLR simulation. The water level increases are as much as
double and triple the RSLR over broad areas and as much as five times the RSLR in isolated
areas.” Jane McKee Smith et al., Potential impact of sea level rise on coastal surges in
southeast Louisiana, 37 OCEAN ENGINEERING 37, 46 (2010).
14. James P.M. Syvitski, Deltas at risk, 3 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 23 (2008).
15. DAVID ROTH, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., LOUISIANA HURRICANE HISTORY 7 (2010),
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/noaa/lahurricanehistory.pdf.
16. Jeffrey P. Donnelly et al., Climate forcing of unprecedented intense-hurricane
activity in the last 2000 years, 3 EARTH’S FUTURE 49, 50 (2015).
17. DELTARES, SINKING CITIES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TOWARDS SOLUTIONS (Oct.
2013), https://www.deltares.nl/app/uploads/2015/09/Sinking-cities.pdf.
18. See generally Laura E. Erban et al., Groundwater extraction, land subsidence, and
sea-level rise in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 084010 (2014); Steve
Brown & Robert J. Nicholls, Subsidence and human influences in mega deltas: The case of
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, 527 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 362, 374 (2015).
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Orleans and the Mississippi delta will provide an example for other highrisk delta cities.
This article takes a deep look into the law in the levee breach cases
because levees are a major risk in many places across the United States. A
congressionally created study panel found that there are perhaps 100,000
miles of levees in the United States, and most have not been properly
maintained.19 As climate change exacerbates flooding events, levee breach
litigation is likely to increase.20 The plaintiffs in the Katrina cases built a
story around a steady state New Orleans that blamed the Corps for all of the
changes over the past fifty years that have made the city ever more
vulnerable to flooding. 21 They had the same sympathetic federal district
court judge for three of the sets of cases.22 He made his position clear early
in the proceedings:
The cruel irony here is that the Corps cast a blind eye, either as a result
of executive directives or bureaucratic parsimony, to flooding caused by
drainage needs and until otherwise directed by Congress, solely focused
on flooding caused by storm surge. Nonetheless, damage caused by
either type of flooding is ultimately borne by the same public fisc. Such
egregious myopia is a caricature of bureaucratic inefficiency. 23
19. NAT’L COMM. ON LEVEE SAFETY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NATIONAL LEVEE
SAFETY PROGRAM, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEVEE
SAFETY 13 (2009), http://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll2/id
/444.
20. Thomas Wahl et al., Increasing risk of compound flooding from storm surge and
rainfall for major US cities, (Advance online publication) NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (2015),
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2736.html;
Iman
Mallakpour & Gabriele Villarini, The changing nature of flooding across the central United
States, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 250 (2015).
21. While not considered in this paper, there were numerous claims by individuals and
businesses without separate flood insurance policies asking the court to find that their general
property insurance covered their flood losses. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected these
claims, finding that it was not against public policy to exclude flood damage by explicit
policy language, and that the standard form policy was not ambiguous as to the definition of a
flood. See Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186 (2008); Landry v. La. Citizens Property
Ins., 983 So. 2d 66 (2008).
22. Local federal judges are loath to rule against their neighbors in mass tort cases
against the federal government. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Allen v.
United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied by Allen v. United States, 484
U.S. 1004 (1988).
23. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 643 (E.D. La.
2008) (17th Street Canal) judgment entered sub nom, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litig., No. 05-4181, 2010 WL 4068739 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2010) aff’d sub nom, In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit I), opinion
withdrawn on reh’g, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Robinson 5th Circuit II). For clarity, the parenthetical references will be used at the end of
the footnote in which each case appears.
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This attitude drove the court’s attempt to convert the administrative
Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) process into a typical mass tort case.

A.

Topography of New Orleans

The topography of New Orleans makes it uniquely dangerous during
hurricanes. Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Coast with higher winds
and surge than New Orleans, but within a few hours of the storm passing
through, most of the water had drained back into the ocean and recovery
could begin. In contrast, people in New Orleans were trapped in their houses
and in shelters for days, with many dying of exposure before they could be
rescued. This is because nearly 50% of New Orleans is below sea level, up
to ten feet below sea level. St. Bernard Parish, east of New Orleans and
between New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina, has significant land as much
as six feet below sea level.
Even the areas that are not below sea level are only slightly above. The
coastal Mississippi delta is very flat and low. The only high ground is on the
natural levees of the current and abandoned Mississippi River channels.
These ridges are as high as twenty feet in New Orleans, but the highest
natural elevation in St. Bernard parish to the east of New Orleans is twelve
feet.24 Even at normal sea level, a large part of the New Orleans area is not
hydrologically stable. It requires levees and constant pumping to prevent the
bowl formed by areas below sea level from filling with water. The city is cut
through with drainage canals that are used to channel this water north to
Lake Pontchartrain.
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, these drainage canals were open
canals with gravity flow to Lake Pontchartrain. The pumps are in the lowest
spots in the city to collect the rain water, well below sea level, and the lake
end of the canal is above sea level to prevent the lake from flowing back
into the city. This requires that the canal be elevated above sea level as it
cuts through the parts of the city that are below sea level. The canal flows
through high levees and concrete flood walls. Even on dry days, the level of
water in the canal is at roof level in many places. This is also true of the
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) between the river and the lake25 (See
24. Paul V. Heinrich, Review of the Engineering Geology of St. Bernard Parish,
Louisiana, 15 LA. GEOLOGICAL SURV. 6 (2005), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/la/geology/
18650587-Engineering-Geology-of-St-Bernard-Parish-Louisiana.pdf.
25. This canal was constructed by the City of New Orleans and the state between 1918
and 1923 to provide a connection between the river, Lake Pontchartrain, and Intracoastal
Canal which provides shipping east to Florida. The canal connects through the Mississippi
through the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock, which was built in 1921. LYNN M.
ALPERIN, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RES. SUPPORT CTR., HISTORY OF THE GULF
INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY, NATIONAL WATERWAYS STUDY NWS-83-9, at 32 (1983),
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/mississippi/NWS_83-9.pdf.
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Figure 1). A breach in the levees or flood walls, or a torrential rain storm
that gets ahead of the pumps will rapidly flood tens of thousands of homes
during times of normal sea level.

Figure 126
The IHNC forks before it reaches Lake Pontchartrain. The left fork
continues to the lake, and the right goes east to connect with the Intracoastal
Waterway, which then continues east to Florida and up the East Coast. The
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), at the heart of all the litigation in
this article, goes from the right fork of the IHNC and to the Gulf of Mexico.
As early as 1921, New Orleans started lobbying Congress to build this
shortcut to connect the Inner Harbor—being built along the fork of IHNC
going to Lake Pontchartrain—to the Gulf of Mexico. This would allow ships
to move from the Mississippi River through the IHNC Lock to the MRGO
and to the Gulf of Mexico, cutting nearly 100 miles off the route through the
river’s mouth south of New Orleans. Joined by eleven governors of states
using Mississippi River shipping, New Orleans succeeded in 1956, and
Congress authorized the construction of the MRGO.27

26. Provided by Richard Campanella, with permission.
27. ALBERT E. COWDREY, LAND’S END 72 (1977), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/
mississippi/Lands-End.pdf.
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The MRGO skirts the edge of Lake Borgne (an arm of the Gulf of
Mexico) and then cuts southeast through wetlands in St. Bernard Parish to
the Gulf of Mexico. Some of this area was slightly above sea level and
supported cypress trees at the time the MRGO was built. Much of the area
the canal was cut through was marsh at sea level. The original IHNC Lock,
which connects the MRGO to the Mississippi River, was too small for ocean
shipping vessels. Congress authorized the expansion of the lock along with
the construction of the MRGO but this expansion was never built, so the
MRGO was never a useful connection between the river and the Gulf.28
Shortly after the MRGO was completed, St. Bernard Parish and east
New Orleans, including the Ninth Ward, were flooded by Hurricane Betsy. 29
Plaintiffs who had been flooded claimed that the MRGO funneled water into
the city and caused their properties to be flooded.30 The historic record
belies this claim. Long before there were any Corps projects in this area,
when the old growth cypress was intact as a buffer, St. Bernard Parish and
the east side of New Orleans were catastrophically flooded by hurricanes
several times.31 During the forty years between Hurricane Betsy and
Hurricane Katrina, the risk of flooding increased substantially because St.
Bernard Parish is on an abandoned lobe of the Mississippi River delta and is
subsiding into the Gulf of Mexico as sea level rises.32
28. Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) Lock Replacement, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/Projects/IHNC-Lock-Replacement/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2019). For a discussion of the limited economic utility of the MRGO, see
William R. Freudenburg et al., Disproportionality and Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 497 (2009).
29. Andy Horowitz, Hurricane Betsy and the Politics of Disaster in New Orleans’s
Lower Ninth Ward, 1965-1967, 80 J. S. HIST. 893, 894 (2014).
30. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1971); claims dismissed for failure
to show any negligence by the government and no evidence of increased flooding caused by
the MRGO: Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189, 193, 196 (E.D. La. 1977).
31. The worst storm of the early years was “The Great Louisiana Hurricane” of August
9, 1812. It rolled over the barrier islands and drowned Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes
and the area around Barataria Bay under 15 feet of water. The parade ground at Fort St.
Phillip was inundated by 8 feet of water and the shoreline along Lake Pontchartrain was
similarly inundated, though this was far enough below the French Quarter to spare any
flooding of the City. J. David Rogers, CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORY OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOOD
PROTECTION SYSTEM 4–14 (2006), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237543570_
CHAPTER_FOUR_HISTORY_OF_THE_NEW_ORLEANS_FLOOD_PROTECTION_
SYSTEM.
32. Heinrich, supra note 24, at 10. (“Ongoing regional and semi-regional subsidence
also has implications for St. Bernard Parish. Subsidence not only accentuates the magnitude
of flooding created by hurricane storm surge by physically lowering the land’s surface with
time, it also reduces the effectiveness of existing levees and other flood control structures by
reducing their height. In addition, subsidence further exacerbates the damage caused by storm
surges by significantly contributing to land loss that reduces the moderating affect that
marshes have on them.”).
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After Katrina, two class action cases resurrected the idea that the
MRGO exacerbates the flooding on the east side by acting as a funnel for
storm surge.33 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,34 discussed in this
article, is a Federal Tort Claims Act case claiming negligence in the
maintenance of the MRGO. St. Bernard Parish Government v. United
States,35 is a takings case based on the MRGO increasing the flooding on the
east side of New Orleans. Claims that the MRGO dramatically increases
flooding defies common sense: MRGO was 2000 feet wide in places and 36
feet deep in 2005. The surge front of the storm was fifty miles wide and
more than fifteen feet high as it approached St. Bernard Parish. This
dwarfed any effect of the MRGO:
The calculated total volume entering the Funnel through the MRGO
Reach 2 channel was 32 million cum. The total volume that entered
through the GIWW channel was 6 million cum. The total volume
entering through the Lake Borgne and the inundated wetlands segment
was 632 million cum. The vast majority of water that moved into the
Funnel, 94%, passed through Lake Borgne and over the inundated
wetlands, not through the channels. Only 5% of the water volume
entered through the MRGO channel, and only 1% entered through the
GIWW
channel.
The storm surge snap-shots show that the Funnel had little influence on
amplification of the storm surge during Katrina. In response to the
predominant momentum balance between wind stress and water surface
slope, maximum surge was generated along the MRGO Reach 2 levee,
perpendicular to the primary and persistent northeasterly winds. Peak
surge did not occur at the apex of the Funnel. 36

These findings were echoed in several other studies that were done by
independent experts, not affiliated with the plaintiffs in these cases.37 There
33. Gary P. Shaffer et al., The MRGO Navigation Project: a massive human-induced
environmental, economic, and storm disaster, 54 J. COASTAL RES. 206, 216 (2009) (note that
some of the authors also participated in the plaintiffs’ litigation).
34. 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II).
35. 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
36. B.A. Ebersole et al., Development of storm surge which led to flooding in St.
Bernard Polder during Hurricane Katrina, 37 OCEAN ENGINEERING 91, 99 (2010).
37. URS CORP., THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER GULF OUTLET ON
HURRICANE STORM SURGE, at ES-2 (“The MRGO channel does not contribute significantly to
peak surge during severe storms, when the conveyance of surge is dominated by flow across
the entire surface of the coastal lakes and marsh. Nor does the channel contribute
significantly to wave run-up”); see also JOANNES WESTERINK ET AL., NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE
OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER GULF OUTLET ON HURRICANE INDUCED STORM SURGE IN NEW
ORLEANS AND VICINITY 5 (2006), http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/cases/katrina/Army
/Army%20Corps%20of%20Engineers/Influence%20of%20the%20MRGO%20on%20Storm
%20Surge.pdf; Pat J. Fitzpatrick et al., Myths about the cause of Hurricane Katrina’s storm
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is a funnel, but it is formed by the intersection of St. Bernard Parish and the
land bridge that closes off Lake Pontchartrain, which is really a bay on the
Gulf of Mexico that a previous lobe of the delta closed off to form what is
now a lake. Surge from the east does pile up in this funnel, just as it did long
before the MRGO was built.38 Without levees in this area, the surge sweeps
across the land bridge into Lake Pontchartrain and across St. Bernard Parish
into east New Orleans. When the levees were added between the canals and
the city, they provided a barrier that a slow-moving storm such as Hurricane
Katrina could pile up surge against until the levees were overtopped and
failed. This failure was not because they had been weakened by a poorly
maintained MRGO, but because Hurricane Katrina had a storm surge and
because they were as much as a meter lower than their design height
because of unrecognized subsidence.39
B.

Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina formed off the Bahamas and skirted south Florida
and the Keys as a minor hurricane. It strengthened as it entered Gulf of
Mexico, becoming a category 5 storm on August 28th about 250 miles south
of the Mississippi-Alabama border.40 Its central pressure fell to 902 mb,
which was the fourth lowest on record for the Atlantic Basin and the lowest
measured inside the Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane Katrina moved across the
tail of the Mississippi delta through lower Plaquemines Parish south of
Buras as a category 4 storm with 140 mph winds at 6:10 AM on the 29th of
August. It moved due north, to the east of New Orleans, and then made a
second landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River at the LouisianaMississippi border at 10:00 AM. At landfall, it was a category 3 storm with
maximum sustained winds near 125 mph.41 The strongest winds and highest
surges are in the northeast quadrant of a hurricane, which passed far to the
surge, 29th Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology, May 10–14 (2010),
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/Fitzpatrick2007.pdf.
38. Joannes J. Westerink et al., A basin-to channel-scale unstructured grid hurricane
storm surge model applied to southern Louisiana, 136 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 833, 859–
860 (2008).
39. Timothy H. Dixon et al., Space geodesy: Subsidence and flooding in New Orleans,
441 NATURE 587 (2006) (“Here we present a new subsidence map for the city, generated
from space-based synthetic-aperture radar measurements, which reveals that parts of New
Orleans underwent rapid subsidence in the three years before Hurricane Katrina struck in
August 2005. One such area is next to the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal,
where levees failed during the peak storm surge: the map indicates that this weakness could
be explained by subsidence of a metre or more since their construction.”).
40. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT:
HURRICANE KATRINA 23–30 AUGUST 2005, at 37 (Dec. 20, 2005), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/
katrina/govdocs/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
41. ROTH, supra note 15, at 54.
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east of New Orleans. The areas outside of the levees on the east and north of
the city were flooded by up to nineteen feet of water, but there was only
limited wind damage in the city and what at first appeared to be little water
inside the levees. The city breathed a sigh of relief until it was recognized
that water was pouring over and through the levees and flood walls into the
city.42 What happened next was driven by the topography of New Orleans.
Hurricane Katrina effectively raised sea level on the east side of New
Orleans by fifteen to nineteen feet and on the north side by ten to fourteen
feet.43 On the east side of the city, the surge washed over the levees and then
breached them, flooding the low-lying land and pouring downhill into the
areas below sea level. On the north side of the city, a flood wall on the 17 th
Street Canal failed, allowing surge from Lake Pontchartrain to flood the city
from the north. Additional drainage canal flood walls were overtopped or
failed and flooded other parts of the city. A floodwall on the International
Harbor Navigation Canal, which is on the west side of the Ninth Ward and
to the east of the French Quarter, failed, allowing flood waters into the Ninth
Ward.44
When the flood walls in the Ninth Ward and the Lakeview area failed,
water rushed into the city. The surge was already waning, but since the areas
inside the flood walls were as much as 10 feet below sea level, it was like a
dam breaking with 20 feet or more of water behind it. The water flowed
down hill into the city as a raging torrent. This was a major factor in the
death rates, because the risk of death from flooding increases dramatically
with the velocity of the water.45 Near the breaches, houses were shattered

42. See Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html (describing the receding
flood waters on the night of Aug. 29, 2005—the day Katrina made landfall—and explaining
that a local hospital had “seemed to have weathered one more storm”); see also Bob
Marshall, City’s Fate Sealed in Hours, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 14, 2006, at A1 (“With
Katrina already north of the city . . . the surge has begun to drop. For levees and floodwalls
still standing, the overtopping is over. But the large sections of levees and floodwalls that
have collapsed will keep bleeding water into the city for more than four days.”).
43. KNABB, supra note 40, at 37.
44. The iconic picture of a barge washed into the Ninth Ward was taken at the location
of the break on the IHNC. See Analysis of the Transit of the Barge ING 4727 During
Hurricane Katrina and Reasons Why it Did Not Cause the Failure of the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal Floodwall at 171, Figure 116, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2011 WL 1792542 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011). In litigation involving
the barge, the district court determined that the barge washed ashore after the break and that
the barge company was not liable for causing the break. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litig., No. 05-4182, 2011 WL 1792542, at *1710 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011).
45. S. N. Jonkman & J. K. Vrijling, Loss of life due to floods, 1 J. FLOOD RISK MGMT.
43, 50 (2008).
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and some were swept off their foundations.46 People had little time to get to
safety in attics. Later analysis showed that “mortality rates were highest in
areas near breaches and in areas with large water depths. The highest
mortality fractions were observed near the severe breaches in Lower 9th
Ward flood wall.”47
The water level’s final equilibrium after the breach was only a few feet
above ordinary sea level, but this was as much as fifteen feet above ground
level in the lowest areas of the city.48 It took several days to plug the holes in
the flood walls and start the pumps to clear the water from the city. This
delay made it difficult to rescue the injured and infirm and greatly increased
the death toll.49
The areas on the ridges did not flood, including most of the French
Quarter. Lower areas that were still above sea level were flooded, but
drained quickly. While there was some wind damage in the New Orleans
metropolitan area, most of the property damage and deaths were due to
flooding in the bowl areas below sea level.
The geologic and hydrologic factors that made Hurricane Katrina so
deadly for New Orleans will increase over time.50 The risk of catastrophic
flooding from any given hurricane increases with relative sea level rise
(subsidence plus sea level rise from climate change). For any given size
storm in the future, the relative sea level rise since Hurricane Katrina will be
added to the inherent surge of the storm.51 As relative sea level increases, the
depth of the bowl formed by the floodwalls and levees increases. The water
behind the dam formed by the flood walls and levees is higher, so more
water will pour into the city, at a higher velocity, than with Hurricane
46. Aimilia K. Pistrika & Sebastiaan N. Jonkman, Damage to residential buildings due
to flooding of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, 54 NAT. HAZARDS 413, 422–423 (2010).
47. Sebastiaan N. Jonkman et al., Loss of Life Caused by the Flooding of New Orleans
After Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship Between Flood Characteristics and
Mortality, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 676, 695 (2009).
48. Pumps begin to drain New Orleans, CNN (Sept. 6, 2005, 2:17 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/05/neworleans.levees/.
49. Joan Brunkard et al., Hurricane Katrina Deaths, Louisiana, 2005, 2 DISASTER MED.
& PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 215–23 (2008) (“The mean age of Katrina victims was 69.0
years (95% confidence interval [CI], 67.8–70.2), and their age range was 0 to 102 years.
Approximately 50% of the people who died as a result of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana
were 75 years old and older.”).
50. A. Miller et al., Risk to life due to flooding in post-Katrina New Orleans, 15 NAT.
HAZARDS & EARTH SYS. SCI. 59 (2015).
51. Ning Lin & Eric Shullman, Dealing with Hurricane Surge Flooding in a Changing
Environment: Part I. Risk Assessment Considering Storm Climatology Change, Sea Level
Rise, and Coastal Development, 31 STOCHASTIC ENVTL. RES. & RISK ASSESSMENT 2379,
2379–2400 (2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00477-016-1377-5 (as sea level
rises, either because of direct sea level rise or because the land is sinking, the surge from the
storm is added to the higher sea level).

706

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Katrina.52 Concerns with social justice and preserving the demographics of
New Orleans lead to adopting a “right of return” policy.53 As a result, there
were no limits on rebuilding in the lowest areas of the city.54 An analysis of
the risk of severe flooding and loss of life in New Orleans with the new
levees and flood control structures in place found that New Orleans is still at
risk of catastrophic flooding.55
Despite the increasing risk of catastrophic flooding through time,
people’s fear of flooding decreases as time passes since the last flooding
event. This leads to more and higher value construction and more population
in the high-risk zone. These are key issues in developing a long-term policy
to manage the risk in New Orleans, but they are notably absent in the steady
state world legal narrative embodied in the claims against the Corps.
II. HURRICANE KATRINA–THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT CASES
When Hurricane Betsy flooded New Orleans in 1965, there were fewer
than eighty-two deaths.56 Hurricane Katrina was not a dramatically stronger
storm when it hit New Orleans, but it killed between 986 and 1440 people in
Louisiana, most of those in the greater New Orleans area.57 Property damage
was estimated at $108 billion.58 As discussed, almost all of the damage and
mortality was due to flooding by storm surge getting through or over levees
and floodwalls. The legal narrative is that the increase in deaths and
destruction was due to the negligenceat bestof the Corps, and that the
Corps should pay to make the injured whole. The hurricane protection
52. Jonkman et al., supra note 47, at 688–98 (the greater the produce of the amount
water and its velocity, the deadlier the flood).
53. Lolita Buckner Inniss, Domestic Right of Return: Race, Rights, and Residency in
New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, A, 27 BC THIRD WORLD L.J. 325
(2007); Chris Kromm & Sue Sturgis, Hurricane Katrina and the guiding principles on
internal displacement, 36 INST. FOR S. STUD. 1, 23 (2008).
54. Marla Nelson et al., Planning, plans, and people: professional expertise, local
knowledge, and governmental action in post-hurricane Katrina New Orleans, 9 CITYSCAPE
23, 29 (2007). By 2015, ten years later, the city had rejected any plans that required not
rebuilding, even in the highest risk neighborhoods. Richard Campanella, The Great Katrina
Footprint Debate 10 years later: TIMES-PICAYUNE, https://www.nola.com/katrina/index
.ssf/2015/05/footprint_gentrification_katri.html (last updated May 29. 2015).
55. Miller, supra note 50, at 59–73 n.50. While this study predicts fewer deaths than
occurred from Hurricane Katrina, it also assumes a 90% evacuation rate of the high-risk parts
of the city. This is likely unrealistic.
56. Estimates range from 81 (Craig E. Colten & Amy R. Sumpter, Social memory and
resilience in New Orleans, 48 NAT. HAZARDS 355, 358 (2009)) to 75 (Arnold L Sugg, The
hurricane season of 1965, 94 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 183 (1966)). These are total deaths
in Louisiana and the number for New Orleans is likely somewhat smaller.
57. Brunkard et al., supra note 49, at 2.
58. KNABB, supra note 40, at 13.
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system design put in place after Hurricane Betsy that was breached by
Hurricane Katrina was designed and constructed by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers.59 The Orleans levee board shared responsibly for the
levees and floodwalls within New Orleans.60 The initial class action lawsuit
for damages due to Hurricane Katrina flooding included the Orleans Levee
Board and the levee boards for other affected parishes as defendants.61
During the pendency of the litigation, the claims against the levee boards
were settled for their aggregate insurance coverage, resulting in payouts of
about $21,000,000 in total.62 This left the Corps as the primary target of the
litigation.63
As a federal agency, the Corps has sovereign immunity from claims,64
except to the extent that the immunity has been waived by the FTCA65 or
that the claim is a debt owned by the United States under the Constitution.66
Cases were filed under the FTCA in the District Court of the Eastern District
of Louisiana and as a takings claim under the Constitution in the Court of
Claims. The takings claim case was stayed until after the proceeding in the
FTCA cases, and relied on the evidence from the FTCA cases.67 Those cases
are not discussed as part of this paper.
The FTCA claims are a complex, interrelated set of cases with
hundreds of orders on the docket.68 All of the FTCA cases were dismissed
eventually, either under the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) or the FTCA.
This made no new law. As will be discussed later, the only interesting legal
point is that they were not dismissed on initial summary judgment. Their

59. J. David Rogers et al., Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the
Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of
New Orleans in 2005, 17 WATER POL’Y 707, 709 (2015).
60. Id.
61. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340, 343 (E.D. La. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010).
62. Id. This initial settlement was rejected on appeal and was replaced by a final
settlement: Vodanovich v. BOH Bros. Const. Co., LLC, No. CIV.A. 05-4191, 2014 WL
5603191, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014).
63. All claims against the Corps have now been dismissed, leaving the settlement by the
levee boards as the only claims paid through the Hurricane Katrina litigation.
64. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
65. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C §2680(h): Exemptions.
66. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
67. See Tommaseo v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 700, 802–03 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The stay
was lifted in St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 765, 771–72 (Fed. Cl. 2011),
and the trial judgment was released in May 2015: St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States,
No. 05-1119, 2015 WL 2058969 (Fed. Cl. May 1, 2015), and St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v.
United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707 (2016).
68. 05-CV-4182 Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, E.D. La., http://www.laed.uscourts
.gov/CanalCases/CanalCases.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
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significance is the steady state narrative about New Orleans that they
embedded in the public’s mind and in the record of the takings case.
The plaintiffs faced three legal hurdles in these cases. First, they had to
get jurisdiction to sue the United States by satisfying the notice of claim
requirements in the FTCA. Second, they had to survive the immunity
provision of the FCA. After New Orleans was flooded by Hurricane Betsy
in 1965, the Corps was directed to come up with a plan to protect the city. It
eventually settled on a ring levee system around the city. While some parts
of the system were still unfinished when Katrina hit, the ring was complete.
With some very limited exceptions, every piece of property at issue in the
litigation against the Corps was inside a levee. The flood waters had to get
over or through a levee to cause damage.
Section 702c of the FCA provides immunity for flood damage: “No
liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place. . . .”69 Hurricane
Betsy flooding led to a case holding that a flood control project that does not
block water still blocks liability.70 The Supreme Court subsequently held
that it is the “character of the waters that cause the relevant damage” 71 that
triggers immunityif the damage is caused by flood waters, the United
States is immune.
Anyone trying to recover from the Corps because Hurricane Katrina
flooded New Orleans has to get the flood waters over or through the flood
control projects without triggering § 702c. Finally, they had to avoid
dismissal under the discretionary authority defense of the FTCA. Some
failed to perfect their FTCA claim;72 some could not overcome FCA
immunity;73 and the narrative that was crafted to avoid FCA immunity
ultimately lead to the dismissal of all of the surviving FTCA cases under the
statutory discretionary authority defense.74
A.

Exhausting the Federal Torts Claims Act Notice Requirements

The FTCA is an administrative compensation system for persons
injured by traditional negligent property and personal injury torts.75 The
69. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
70. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 25–26 (5th Cir. 1971).
71. Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 436 (2001).
72. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 05-4182, 2008 WL
4449970 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008) (IHNC). For clarity, the parenthetical reference will be
used at the end of the footnotes in which this case appears.
73. In re Katrina, 533 F. Supp. 2d 615 (E.D. La. 2008) (17th Street Canal).
74. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson
5th Circuit II).
75. The FTCA originally allowed plaintiffs to bring their claim directly in District Court.
This clogged up the courts with claims that could have been settled before trial, so the notice
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FTCA excludes intentional torts, except some committed by law
enforcement officers.76 After the administrative claims process has been
exhausted, the plaintiff has jurisdiction to appeal the agency’s offer of
settlement or denial of the claim to the district court. This is a simple
process for individual claims with a clear etiology. As the Katrina cases
show, it is more difficult to satisfy with tens of thousands of claimants and
shifting theories of liability. What would have been a straight forward class
action against a private party becomes a complex procedural problem that
was never resolved in the litigation.
The FTCA allows a claimant two years after the incident causing the
injury to file a claim with the agency that caused the injury. The claim must
state the name of the claimant and any necessary identifying information so
that that agency can contact the person. The claim must state the facts
supporting how the government caused the injury and a specific dollar
demand.77 The agency has six months to make an offer to settle the claim or
to reject the claim. The claim can be amended and that restarts the sixmonth clock for agency review. Substantive amendments which postulate
new injuries or different mechanisms of injury must be filed within the
initial two-year period. Exhaustion is not complete until the agency acts on
the claim or six months expires after the presentation of the claim. If the
agency does not act on the claim by six months, it is deemed denied. Once
the process is exhausted, the claimant has jurisdiction to contest the
agency’s ruling in federal district court.78
The claimant has six months to appeal the agency’s denial or
inadequate award to the district court. The two-year statute of limitation on
filing the initial claim and the six-month limitation on filing in court can be

provision was added in 1966. See Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub.L. No. 89–506, § 2, 80 Stat.
(1966); see also Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1980), decision
clarified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. As originally passed, intentional torts were completely excluded. There was
speculation in a Senate Report that this was because of the inflammatory nature of potential
beating claims against the FBI. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 547 n.84
(1947). This left these claims to private bills and the discretion of Congress. But after Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422–23 (1971)
allowed a direct, constitutionally-based action for intentional harm by federal officials, the
FTCA was amended to its present form to keep these cases within the ambit of the FTCA
limitations.
77. DOJ provides a Form 95 to use for filing claims. The courts have held that the form
is not required as long as the agency received actual notice. DOJ has promulgated regulations
that outline the necessary information for stating a claim. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4.
78. If the plaintiff files before receiving an offer or denial from the agency and before
the 6-month “deemed denied” period, the action is premature because there is no jurisdiction.
The United States can raise this at any point and the action must be dismissed. McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 108 (1993).
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equitably tolled for good cause.79 If the claim is deemed denied—if the
claimant gets no response from the United States—there is no limitations
period for filing the claim. But if the agency acts on the deemed-denied
claim at any point in the future, the six-month clock starts ticking. 80 While
the Court has found that the time periods in the statute are not jurisdictional,
perfecting the notice of claim is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the
courts.
The court cannot shorten the required timeframes. A complaint filed in
district court before the agency claims process is complete and the agency
has had the statutory time to respond is premature and must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. If the claimant has not filed a claim with the agency
when the lawsuit is filed, the claim cannot be filed while the lawsuit is
pending. If the two-year limitations period expires before the lawsuit is
dismissed and the claim is filed, the claim will be barred. If the claim has
been filed and the agency has not acted on it, the agency will not proceed
until the lawsuit is dismissed. This becomes important in the Hurricane
Katrina FTCA litigation because several lawyers were filing putative class
actions covering the same potential classes, which potentially complicated
exhausting the FTCA claims process.
1.

The Exhaustion Issues in the Hurricane Katrina Federal Torts
Claims Act Litigation

Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans on August 29, 2005, starting
the two-year clock on FTCA claims. The ensuing FTCA cases posed
variations of two exhaustion problems: adding additional theories of loss to
proper claims, and determining if plaintiffs in putative class action lawsuits
had individually exhausted the FTCA claims process. The original petition
in what the Court styled the Robinson81 case was filed by six named
plaintiffs on April 25, 2006.82 Each plaintiff provided proof that a proper
claim under the FTCA had been filed with the Corps.83 They stated a dollar
demand for flooding damages and this statement of liability facts:

79. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (2015).
80. Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015).
81. Hurricane Katrina spawned a complex web of litigation. There are several different
plaintiff groups with different claims against different defendants. The dispute that went to
trial (In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009)) was
characterized as the Robinson case by the court and this name was used for the multiple
orders and preliminary holdings leading up to the final appeals court ruling (In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012)).
82. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 05-4182, 2008 WL
4449970, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008) (IHNC).
83. Id.
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[A]ll of the damage complained of herein were caused as a direct and
proximate result of negligence of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers in the design, construction, and maintenance of the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet navigational/shipping structure located in
St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes in Louisiana. 84

In May 2008, plaintiffs made the court aware that they intended to
make additional claims based on allegedly negligent work by a government
contractor associated with the repair of a lock on the IHNC. 85 The Court
found that this was not a logical extension of the original petition and
ordered plaintiffs to file an amended petition.86 The new Count 3 alleged
that the Corps was negligent in overseeing a contractor working in “ . . . the
East Bank Industrial Area (“EBIA”) adjacent to the Inner Harbor
Navigational Chanel (“IHNC”) or the Industrial Canal.”87 The United States
filed a motion to dismiss the new count based on failure to provide proper
notice under the FTCA.88
The United States argued that it was entitled to notice of the specific
mechanism of injury that plaintiff intended to rely on and that it did not have
a duty to look behind the notice and find unnamed negligent acts.89 Plaintiffs
argued that the statute only requires them to notify the agency of the nature
of their injury and a proposed mechanism of injury.90 It then becomes the
agency’s duty to investigate the claim, including other possible mechanisms
of injury: once the Corps was on notice that plaintiffs had been flooded by
Hurricane Katrina, it was up to the Corps to find out how it happened.91
The Court looked to a medical malpractice case, Portillo v. United
States,92 for guidance on necessary specificity of a claim. 93 In Portillo,
plaintiff’s notice to the agency described an injury caused by negligent postop monitoring and urinary catheterization, leading to a urinary tract
infection and subsequent injury.94 Plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit alleged that
the injury was due to negligent administration of spinal anesthesia leading to
spinal nerve damage.95 In determining whether the original notice was
adequate, the Portillo court looked to the purpose of the administrative
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *2 (IHNC).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4
In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *4 (IHNC).
816 F. Supp. 444, 446 (W.D. Tex.1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1994).
In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *5–6 (IHNC).
Portillo, 816 F. Supp. at 445.
Id.
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notice: facilitating the agency’s investigation of the claim to determine if
there was negligence and, if so, the appropriate compensation.96 The court
found the information about a post-surgical injury caused by nursing staff
did not put the agency on notice of an in-surgery injury by anesthesia staff.97
Based on this reading of the notice requirement, the Robinson court
found that plaintiff’s Form 95 notice, the form filed with the Corps, did not
mention any negligence associated with areas described in Count 3: “There
is simply no indication that the EBIA, and the work of WGI would be the
subject of this lawsuit.”98 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that since so many other parties had filed claims, someone must have put the
Corps on notice.99 The court found no case supporting this notion of
vicarious notice and it was not prepared to find it in this case.100 Since
plaintiffs failed to perfect notice for the allegations in Count 3, the court
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.101
2.

The Class Action Issue and Exhaustion

The FTCA was meant to deal with individual injuries that occurred
through pure negligence that is untainted by executive choice or planning—
postal trucks running over dogs, for example—not mass disasters. Mass
disasters would continue to be dealt with through legislation without regard
to the fault of the government.102 The United States generally, and
specifically in these cases, took the position that there cannot be an FTCA
class action.103 The precedent is not completely clear as to whether there can
96. Id. at 446.
97. Id. at 448. In looking at the medical issues, the court found that these are completely
different injuries. Id. The only way the agency could have discovered that it was a spinal
nerve problem would have been to physically examine the plaintiff. Id.
98. In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *6 (IHNC).
99. Id. at *6.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *7 (finding that even if notice had been perfected, the plaintiffs were barred by
the statute of limitations from adding a new count based on facts that did not relate back to
the original filing).
102. The primary vehicle for this is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. “If the President declares a major disaster or
emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of
1981 (the Stafford Act), then the community becomes eligible for significant federal
assistance under programs of the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).” Ernest B. Abbott, Representing Local Governments in
Catastrophic Events: DHS/FEMA Response and Recovery Issues, 37 URB. L. 467 (2005); see
also FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33053, FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES, AND FUNDING
(Summary) (2011).
103. United States of America’s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss & Resp. to the
Mot’s to Intervene and Consol., In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig. Pertains to:
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be an FTCA class action. The cases that have not categorically ruled out
FTCA class actions have said that every plaintiff must meet the notice
requirement.104 Most do not meet the standard, and the ones that met the
standard look more like multi-party ligation. Thus, everyone who was going
to be in the class to sue the Corps would have to file a claim that specified
all the mechanisms of their injury, not just that they were flooded and that it
was up to the Corps to find out why. The Robinson ruling showed there was
a significant question as to the adequacy of the notice for many claims. The
court in the Class Certification Case took the limited position that plaintiffs
who had complied with the notice requirement could petition for a class
certification, but that it was not granting class certification at this point.105
The United States asked for three of the exemplar plaintiffs in the
MRGO Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint to be dismissed over
the same notice issue as in the Robinson ruling.106 There was no certified
class at this point.107 The court’s handling of the motion to dismiss
highlights the problems of trying to fit FTCA claims into a class action
structure. First is the confusion over whether notice from a single member of
a class meets the standard of individualized notice required for an FTCA
claim for all members of the class:
Perhaps one of the most confounding problems with the issues before the
Court is the immensity of notice in general that the Corps certainly had
MRGO., 2009 WL 4068432, text accompanying n.43 (E.D. La.) [hereinafter Notice Case
Memo Two] (“Throughout the course of this litigation, the United States has steadfastly
maintained that Rule 23 class actions are incompatible with the FTCA, and that one set of
plaintiffs cannot institute an action on behalf of other claimants without their express
permission to do so.”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 054182, 2009 WL 1649501, at *2 (E.D. La. June 9, 2009) (Class Certification Case). For
clarity, the parenthetical reference will be used at the end of the footnote in which this case
appears.
104. Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 227 (8th Cir. 1977) held that a class could
be certified if there was legal authority to represent all of the potential claimants and there
was a specific settlement demand for the class. However, plaintiffs did not meet the standard,
so this was dicta. A later case specifically denied to certify a class unless every claimant had
complied with the statutory notice requirement. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 757, 760 (E.D. N.Y. 1980). “Appellants FTCA claims therefore must be dismissed for
failure to meet the statute’s stringent ‘file first with the agency’ instruction.” Hohri v. United
States, 782 F.2d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 75 (1987).
105. In re Katrina, 2009 WL 1649501 at *6 (Class Certification Case) (“To be clear, this
Court’s opinion concludes only that (1) a class action can be maintained against the United
States under the FTCA if that class is comprised of those who have complied with all of the
FTCA’s administrative claim requirements. . . . This Court makes no intimation concerning
the likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed in certifying the class under Rule 23.”).
106. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. CA 05-4182, 2010 WL 487431, at
*1 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2010) (Notice Case). For clarity, the parenthetical reference will be used
at the end of the footnote in which this case appears.
107. Id. at *14.
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with respect to these defalcations—that is the failure of the IHNC
floodwalls allegedly caused by its activities at the EBIA. For example, a
premature suit was filed by Fred Holmes and Alvin Livers on August 28,
2006 which states unequivocally the theory of negligence as to the Corps
and WGI. C.A. 06–5161.108

The court was clearly unhappy that the Corps wanted to hold each
claimant to the law’s requirements. The court went against the clear
precedent that each claimant must meet the notice standard individually on
the face of the claim filed with the agency. The Corps had no right to waive
this requirement, but the Court seemed to imply that the Corps should
effectively waive it at this point by not moving to dismiss. The court also
expressed its frustration that the Corps did not move to dismiss the claims
for prematurity and failure of notice when there would have been time for
the plaintiffs to refile, as if the Corps was tricking the plaintiffs by waiting
until it was too late to refile before moving to dismiss.109
The Court’s frustration was driven by the United States’ fundamental
objection to finding exhaustion for most of the FTCA claims, including the
ones at issue in the Notice Case. The United States maintained that a
comprehensive class action lawsuit had been pending since August 2006,
and that this lawsuit prevented the plaintiffs involved from perfecting
notice.110 This was based on McNeil v. United States, which looked at
whether filing a premature lawsuit—a lawsuit filed before exhaustion of the
FCTA claims process—prevented the claimant from completing the claims
process.111 Some lower courts had treated premature lawsuits as being on
hold until the claims process was complete, with the lawsuit being instituted
when the process was completed.112 The McNeil court rejected this view,
finding that filing of the lawsuit was the initiation date.113 If this was before
the claim was presented, the claim had to be dismissed. The plaintiff would
need to dismiss the lawsuit and refile it within the six-month window or the
claim would be time barred.
Since the two-year clock had started on August 29, 2005, potential
plaintiffs had to file their completed claims by the end of the two years, then
108. Id. at *18 n.4.
109. Id. at *6. It must be noted that never during any of these proceedings did the United
States ever raise an issue with respect to the prematurity of the filing of the original MRGO
Master Complaint or that the Form 95s were inadequate so as to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction over the EBIA claim.
110. See Notice Case Memo Two, supra note 104, text accompanying n.103. There was
more than one complaint filed, extending back to at least April 2006.
111. 508 U.S. 106 (1993).
112. Id. at 111.
113. Id. at 112 (“In its statutory context, we think the normal interpretation of the word
‘institute’ is synonymous with the words ‘begin’ and ‘commence.’”).
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wait six months, or until the claim was denied by the agency, to file their
lawsuit.114 Under the American Pipe standard, when the class action was
filed, it stopped the administrative process for all the members of the
class.115 If the potential class members had not individually exhausted the
FTCA process for their claims before the filing of the class action, they
could not do so as long as the lawsuit was pending. By August 29, 2007, the
window had closed for filing or substantively amending the administrative
claims.116 The Notice Case court does not address this argument directly, but
rejects the notion that the class action prevented Entergy plaintiffs in this
case from exhausting the FTCA process and does not dismiss their claims.117
The court never resolved most of the notice issues. It left a class action
claim pending but no class certification.118 The court had refused to accept
the plaintiffs’ attorney’s motion to join 30,000 unnamed plaintiffs, holding
that there was no evidence that each had exhausted the administrative
process.119 Had the ultimate Robinson court verdict survived the appeals
process, the United States would have contested jurisdiction for every
plaintiff, including some in the original exemplar trial. It would also have
contested using an exemplar trial, demanding that every individual case be
tried.
Once the court had accepted that at least some of the cases had
exhausted the FTCA claims process and had jurisdiction to file suit, the
court addressed the next hurdle: getting past the immunity provisions of the
FCA.

114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675 (West, Westlaw through 2018) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401 (West,
Westlaw through 2018).
115. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (“We are convinced that
the rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must be that the commencement
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of
the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class
action.”).
116. The window closed two years after the Hurricane Katrina flooding that is the subject
of the litigation.
117. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., CA No. 05-4182, 2010 WL 487431, at
*18 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2010) (Notice Case).
118. Id. at *14 (“The Court has deferred ruling on the certification issue in MRGO. As
the causation and immunity issues were decided in the Robinson case, until that judgment is
affirmed, a decision on the class certification is premature. It should be noted that plaintiffs’
have also filed a number of “mass joinder” suits which purport to bring individual suits on
behalf of thousands of claimants.”) Since the appeals court dismissed all the claims, the class
issues were never resolved, and record is very confusing.
119. Id. at *15.
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The Flood Control Act of 1928

Once satisfied that the plaintiffs in the FTCA cases had exhausted their
administrative remedies so the court had jurisdiction, the court turned to the
immunity provisions of the FCA.120 The FCA was passed after the 1927
Mississippi River flood. The Mississippi has always had major floods.121 As
with the devastation in New Orleans, the floods became devastating to
people and property as levees allowed people to live and farm and build
cities in the river flood plain.122 The Corps laid out the basic framework for
navigation and flood control for the Mississippi River in an 1861 report.123
The Civil War began as the report was released and delayed action on the
plan for several years.124 On April 26, 1876, the Mississippi River changed
course, stranding the important port of Vicksburg and the Corps’s
headquarters there.125 Stabilizing the river and building a new channel to
Vicksburg began the comprehensive control of the Mississippi River that
continues to this day.126 The FCA was one of a series of flood control acts
passed to implement this plan.127
Major river flood control projects share the levee effect problem with
coastal flood control. It has the additional problem that the huge volume of
water in a major flood—many cubic miles of water—cannot be contained
with ever-higher levee walls. The system has to have safety valves called
“fuse plug levees” and spillways that divert water from the river into
floodways that allow water to flood areas where people will not be
endangered and where there will be little property damage.128 Keeping the
120. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
121. Matthew D. Therrell & Margaret B. Bialecki, A multi-century tree-ring record of
spring flooding on the Mississippi River, 529 J. HYDROLOGY 490, Table I (2015).
122. A. A. HUMPHREYS & H. L. ABBOT, REPORT UPON THE PHYSICS AND HYDRAULICS OF
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER: UPON THE PROTECTION OF THE ALLUVIAL REGION AGAINST OVERFLOW;
AND UPON THE DEEPENING OF THE MOUTHS (JB Lippincott & Co., 1861), https://archive.org
/details/reportuponphysi00abbogoog/page/n9.
123. Id.
124. JAMES M. WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE NATION’S
RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 5 (Wendy L. Hessler ed., 2000).
125. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 218 (1904).
126. Christopher Morris, Reckoning with “the Crookedest River in the World”: The Maps
of Harold Norman Fisk, 52 S. Q. 30, 31–32 (2015).
127. See Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 3–8 (1913) for a history of Mississippi
flood control efforts before the passage of the FCA
128. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1939) (“The 1928 Act here
involved accepted the conceptionunderlying the plan of General Jadwin of the Army
Engineersthat levees alone would not protect the valley from floods. Upon the assumption
that there might be floods of such proportions as to overtop the river’s banks and levees
despite all the Government could do, this plan was designed to limit to predetermined points
such escapes of floodwaters from the main channel. The height of the levees at these
predetermined points was not to be raised to the general height of the levees along the river.
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river from flooding one area often results in it flooding a different area.129
For example, Mississippi River flood control started with levees on the main
channel.130 The levees allow the flooding river to get higher than the level of
its tributaries, causing them to back up and flood upstream of where they
enter the main river.131 Section 702c of the FCA makes it clear that the if the
government was going to spend federal money building a flood control
system, it was not going to be subject to legal claims over the zero sum
decisions involved in river flood control.132
Section 702c of the FCA states, “No liability of any kind shall attach to
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place.”133 At the time this was passed, it might be best seen as
a policy statement, rather than an important legal limit on claims. Prior to
the conditional waiver of sovereign immunity by the FTCA, the only claims
allowed against the United States for flood related claims were takings cases
under the Constitution. As constitutional claims, they were not affected by §
702c. The passage of the FTCA created a vehicle for bringing claims that
implicated § 702c. The Eighth Circuit in National Manufacturing Company
v. United States held that the FTCA did not abrogate § 702c, finding that the
FTCA preempted only the specific list of laws that were part of its text.134
Once the National Manufacturing court found that the § 702c
immunity was still intact, it had to determine if immunity extended beyond
flood control projects. The plaintiffs claimed that the United States was
negligent by failing to provide adequate information about the flood levels
of the river that subsequently flooded plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs
attempted to avoid § 702c by not making any claims about the levees or the
These lower points for possible flood spillways were designated ‘fuse plug levees.’ Flood
waters diverted over these lower ‘fuse plug levees’ were intended to relieve the main river
channel and thereby prevent general flooding over the higher levees along the banks.”).
129. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 217–18 (1904). Stabilizing the river after
Vicksburg was cut off led to litigation by land owners who argued that keeping the river from
further advancing in its new course flooded their land. The court found that the Corps was not
liable for a taking because their efforts to protect on part of the river bank increased the
flooding on another part.
130. William Murray Black, The Problem of the Mississippi, 224 N. AM. REV. 630, 630
(1927).
131. This is known as backwater flooding.
132. But cf. Stover v. United States, 332 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1964) (“It may be that
morally and financially the plaintiffs have been grievously wronged by their government; that
in protecting others it injured them. It is not committed to us to remake the statute. That the
limitation should happen to be in the statute is understandable. Appropriations for flood
control do not come automatically. Dozens of congressmen have no flood control problems.
Perhaps, as a condition to their consent to flood control appropriations, they impose such
limitations as § 702c.”).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
134. 210 F.2d 263, 278 (8th Cir. 1954).
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flood control program.135 The court found that the FCA represented a core
policy decision by Congress:
Undoubtedly that absolute freedom of the government from liability for
flood damages is and has been a factor of the greatest importance in the
extent to which congress has been and is willing to make appropriations
for flood control and to engage in costly undertakings to reduce flood
damage.136

The National Manufacturing court held that the key to understanding §
702c is determining whether the damage is caused by flood waters, not the
mechanism of the damage.137 In this case, the alleged mechanism was faulty
river stage reporting, but actual damage was caused by flood waters.138
While the flood damages were only an indirect effect of the claimed
negligence, the court found the only legal question is whether the damages
were caused by flood waters.139 If so, the United States is immune.140 The
court is clear that immunity extends to any damages caused directly or
indirectly by flood waters, without regard to negligence or the presence or
absence of flood control structures:
The language used shows Congressional anticipation that it will be
claimed after the happening of floods that negligence of government
employees was a proximate cause of damages where floods or flood
waters have destroyed or damaged goods. But the section prohibits
government liability of ‘any kind’ and at ‘any place’. So that uniformly
and throughout the country at any place where there is damage ‘from’ or
‘by’ a flood or flood waters in spite of and notwithstanding federal flood
control works no liability of any kind may attach to or rest upon the
United States therefor.141

135. Id. at 269.
136. Id. at 271.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 271.
140. Nat’l Mfg., 210 F.2d at 271 (“The section does not limit the bar against such
recovery to cases where floods or flood waters are the sole cause of damages. It does bar
liability of any kind from damages ‘by’ floods or flood waters but it goes further and in
addition it bars liability for damages that result (even indirectly) ‘from’ floods.”).
141. Id.; see also Stover v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 477, 483 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (“[I]t is
of no consequence how negligent the Government may (or may not) have been, if it be shown
that the inundations, even in part, resulted from, and were actually caused by, such natural
forces.”); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406, 408
(N.D. Cal. 1954) (“[T]his Court is of the opinion that [§ 702c’s] purpose was to prevent the
Government from being held liable for the staggering amount of damage caused by natural
floods, merely because the Government had embarked upon a vast program of flood
control.”).
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The New Orleans Flood Control Act Jurisprudence

The first major hurricane to flood New Orleans after the FTCA was
passed was the 1947 Hurricane.142 It caused severe flooding in New Orleans
in many of the same areas as Katrina, in particular the Ninth Ward.143 The
next major flood was Hurricane Betsy in 1965: “Vast areas of Orleans,
Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes were inundated by the tidal surge that
accompanied the storm. This surge either overtopped or breached the nonFederal levee protecting these areas.”144 In Graci v. United States,145
plaintiffs on the east side of New Orleans who had been flooded by
Hurricane Betsy filed an FTCA complaint in the District Court of the
Eastern District of Louisiana claiming that negligent construction of the
MRGO caused their homes to flood.146 Forty years later, effectively the
same claims were made in the same court after Hurricane Katrina.
The district court in Graci recognized § 702c immunity for flood
control projects, but drew a distinction between flood control projects and
navigation projects. The court recognized the policy behind protecting the
government from liability for flooding related to flood control programs, but
reads navigation projects out of § 702c protection:
There may be a valid governmental interest in avoiding liability for
floods in connection with navigation improvement projects; the great
public interest served by these projects might be inhibited by a
willingness of courts to permit what could well become an avalanche of
suits in such cases. But we do not think that such an interest, absent its
expression in positive law, warrants the complete and absolute
prohibition of all suits against the government for floodwater damage in
the face of the more liberal policy of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We
think the public interest in navigation improvements and in the
avoidance to that end of burdensome litigation is better served,
consistent with the policy considerations of the FTCA, by an equitable
approach which might severely inhibit suits for flood damage, but at the
same time leave certain avenues open for action in cases of flagrant
wrongdoing.147

142. While hurricane naming was not formally adopted until late, this hurricane was also
known as Hurricane George. H.C. Sumner, North Atlantic hurricanes and tropical
disturbances of 1947, 75 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 251, 252 (1947); see also ROTH, supra
note 15, at 36.
143. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 901.
144. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REPORT ON HURRICANE BETSY 8 (1965), http://www.
iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/hpdc/docs/19651100_Hurricane_Betsy.pdf.
145. 301 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1969) aff’d and remanded, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971).
146. Id. at 949.
147. Graci, 301 F. Supp. at 955.
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This ignores the plain language of § 702c, “No liability of any kind
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by
floods or flood waters at any place,”148 and substitutes immunity that is
limited to flood control structures but not navigation projects. The Fifth
Circuit in Graci149 also assumed that the MRGO was a conduit that allowed
storm surge from Hurricane Betsy to flood eastern New Orleans and St.
Bernard Parish.150 The appeals court asked “[w]hether it is reasonable to
suppose that in exchange for its entry into flood control projects the United
States demanded complete immunity from liability for the negligent and
wrongful acts of its employees unconnected with flood control projects.”151
The court looked to Peterson v. United States for guidance.152 Peterson
arose from dynamiting a natural ice dam on a river in Alaska by military
personnel.153 When the blasting broke up the dam, it caused a massive flood
downstream, flooding plaintiffs’ property.154 The lower court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims based on reading § 702c as barring all claims due to
damage by flood waters.155 The appeals court in Peterson looked to whether
the damage was related to a congressional appropriation for flood control,
rather than to the nature of the flood waters.156 The court found that the
flooding was not the result of a flood control plan done at the direction of
Congress, but that it was a decision to “alleviate and control the flood waters
in an attempt to prevent further damage in the Badger Road Area at Ladd
Air Force Base, and in the Fairbanks area.”157 Thus, the court found that
despite being a flood control measure, the dynamiting was not covered by §
702c immunity.158
Based on the Peterson holding, the appeals court in Graci concluded
that it would be unreasonable to assume that Congress intended for FCA
immunity to reach projects that were not designed for flood control.159
148. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
149. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971).
150. Id. at 22.
151. Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).
152. 367 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1966).
153. Id. at 272.
154. Id.
155. Peterson v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 867, 873 (D. Alaska 1963) (“The water and
ice which damaged the plaintiff’s vessels on May 3, 1960, were a part of a flood, within the
meaning of the terms ‘floods or flood waters’ as used in Title 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c. Section
702c of Title 33 U.S.C.A. therefore provides the defendant, United States of America, with a
complete legal defense to this action.”).
156. Peterson, 367 F.2d at 275 (“The decision to dynamite the ice jam was wholly
unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control,
or any act undertaken pursuant to any such authorization.”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 276.
159. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 26–27 (5th Cir. 1971)..
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Because MRGO was strictly a navigation canal, the court ruled that § 702c
did not apply and remanded so that the FTCA case could go forward.160 This
ruling ignored the symmetry of flood control decisions: flood control plans
are as much about which levees and structures are not built as those that are
built. By abrogating immunity for flooding related to navigation systems,
Graci opens the Corps to liability for flood damage associated with any
Corps project not defined as a flood control project. This could force the
Corps to build flood control systems on all Corps-constructed navigation
systems that could flood land that would not otherwise have flooded.161 On
remand, the district court found that the MRGO was properly constructed
and dismissed the claims.162 Since the United States prevailed, no appeal
was taken on the construction of the FCA.
2.

The Supreme Court Reviews § 702c after Graci

While a number of cases cite Graci, none actually follow its holding,
and all of them abrogate § 702c immunity for damages caused by flood
waters in the absence of a flood control structure.163 The United States
Supreme Court first looked at § 702c in United States v. James.164 This
Louisiana case arose from recreational water users who were injured or
killed when the Corps negligently operated floodgates.165 James upheld a
broad reading of § 702c, finding ample support in the legislative history for
extending its reach beyond property claims and applying it to recreational

160. Id. at 27–28.
161. To protect against future flooding, the Corps built the flood control levees between
the MRGO and all the populated areas of New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. Mark
Schleifstein, Upgraded metro New Orleans levees will greatly reduce flooding, even in 500year storms, NOLA (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2013/08/
upgrated_metro_new_orleans_lev.html.
162. Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189, 196 (E.D. La. 1977).
163. See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 612 (1986) (following a “plain
language” approach to interpreting § 702c); Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229
(8th Cir. 1977) (discussing differences between National Manufacturing and Graci, but
ultimately remanding because of ripeness considerations); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying § 702c to “‘floods or flood waters’ in
connection with flood control projects” (quoting Graci, 456 F.2d at 25–27)); Britt v. United
States, 515 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (“The United States’ flood immunity is not
limited to that resulting from its actions taken in connection with such physical flood control
structures as dams, dikes and levees.”); for additional cases which distinguish Graci, see
Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1989); Callaway v. United
States, 568 F.2d 684, 686–87 (10th Cir. 1978); Morici Corp. v. United States, 491 F. Supp.
466, 473 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Ledford v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Okla.
1977).
164. James, 478 U.S. at 597.
165. Id. at 599.
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users of a flood control lake who were injured by flood waters.166 Since
James had both flood waters and a flood control structure, it did not need to
clarify Graci.
The second, and most recent, United States Supreme Court case to look
at § 702c is Central Green Co. v. United States.167 Central Green deals with
a regional irrigation system in California.168 This was a combined flood
control and irrigation system fed by natural streams. 169 When these streams
were flooded, the system would function as a flood control system.170 Thus,
parts of the system might channel both flood and normal (irrigation) flow.171
The plaintiff was a pistachio grower who argued that seepage through the
walls of the canal near his orchards led to subsurface flooding.172 This
damaged his orchard and increased his operating costs.173 He argued
negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the canal, but
made no claims that dams or flood control structures were at fault.174
The government argued that it should be immune from damages if any
part of the system was related to flood control.175 The lower courts agreed,
dismissing the claim.176 The Supreme Court shared the discomfort of the
lower courts in the breadth of the immunity claimed by the United States,
quoting the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that, under such a test, there would seem
to be no “set of facts where the government is not immune from damage
arising from water that at one time passed through part of the Central Valley
or other flood control project.”177
Ignoring Graci, the Court looked at how other previous cases had used
the nexus with a flood control structure to narrow the exceptions, noting that
“some courts have focused on whether the damage relates in some, often
tenuous, way to a flood control project, rather than whether it relates to

166. Id. at 612 (“It is true that during the debates on the Act, several Congressmen used
the terms ‘liability’ and ‘damage’ to refer only to property damage caused by the construction
of the flood control projects. But . . . there are numerous passages in the legislative history
that emphasize the intention of Congress to protect the Federal Government from any
damages liability that might arise out of flood control”).
167. 531 U.S. 425 (2001).
168. Id. at 427.
169. Id. at 427; see also id. at 434.
170. Id. at 427–28, 436.
171. Id. at 427–28, 436.
172. Id. at 427.
173. Central Green Co., 531 U.S. at 427.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 436.
176. Id. at 427–28.
177. Id. at 428 (quoting Central Green Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.
1999)).
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‘floods or flood waters.’”178 The Court noted that while this distinction was
used in James, it was dictum since the damages were caused by flood
waters.179 The Court then looked to the vast size of the Central Valley
irrigation system and found that characterizing every drop of water that
flowed through the system as flood water “unnecessarily dilutes the
language of the statute.”180 To narrow the scope of § 702c, the Court held:
Accordingly, the text of the statute directs us to determine the scope of
the immunity conferred, not by the character of the federal project or the
purposes it serves, but by the character of the waters that cause the
relevant damage and the purposes behind their release.
. . . [I]n determining whether § 702c immunity attaches, courts should
consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather
than the relation between that damage and a flood control project.181

The Court recognized that its analysis repudiated the broad dicta in
James.182 The Court also recognized that while it is usually simple to tell if a
single release of water is flood water, the damage in this case stretched over
years.183 During some of that time there might have been flood water in the
canal, but most of the time the water would be irrigation water not subject to
§ 702c immunity.184 The lower court’s dismissal was reversed, and the case
was remanded to determine the character of the water that caused the
damage.185 Central Green appears to implicitly overrule Graci’s focus on
flood control structures as a predicate to § 702c immunity, but it does not
specifically address Graci. There is only limited additional construction of
Central Green as applied to flood water damage before the Hurricane
Katrina cases, and none by the Supreme Court.186

178. Id. at 430 (quoting Washington v. E. Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 105 F.3d 517,
519 (9th Cir. 1997)).
179. Central Green Co., 531 U.S at 431.
180. Id. at 433–34.
181. Id. at 434, 437.
182. Id. at 436.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Central Green Co., 531 U.S at 437.
186. Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV-HUCK, 2007 WL 842136, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 20, 2007) rev’d on other grounds sub nom (holding that beach renourishment
projects are not flood control structures, and the ocean absent a storm is not flood water);
Downs v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 333 F. App’x 403 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that TVA
dams are entitled to § 702c immunity); Fortner v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 3:04-CV-363,
2005 WL 2922190, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2005) (case remanded to determine if the river
was flooding); Poindexter v. United States, No. CIV.A.04-1035, 2005 WL 6169020, at *9
(W.D. La. Dec. 9, 2005), rev’d, 244 F. App’x 561 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Flood Control Act Immunity in Robinson187

The Robinson plaintiffs’ complaint is structured to avoid § 702c
immunity by building on Graci. They argued that the Corps was negligent in
the construction and post-construction maintenance of the MRGO.188
Gracidecided by the same court decades earlierfound that the MRGO
had nothing to do with flood control; thus, § 702c did not apply. The
plaintiffs in both cases argued that the MRGO funneled storm surge into the
city, exacerbating flooding of the same areas, occupied in some cases by the
same people. The difference is that the Corps built flood control levees
between the city and the MRGO after the flooding in 1965.189 Even reading
Central Green to preserve Graci, it would seem that the confluence of flood
waters from Hurricane Katrina breaching flood control structures should
trigger § 702c immunity.
The United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that § 702c preserved its sovereign immunity
despite the FTCA and thus the court did not have jurisdiction because
plaintiffs’ claims were all rooted in damage caused by floodwaters.190 The
court analyzed this under Graci, its own decision from 1971, decided long
before Central Green and its focus on flood waters rather than flood
control.191 Mirroring Graci, the court found that since plaintiffs were only
claiming damages from negligence related to MRGO, they were not barred
by § 702c immunity.192 As for the problem of the damages being caused by
flood waters going through or over flood control structures, the court
analogized the flood waters to a Navy ship, breaking through the levee
because it was negligently moored:

187. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (E.D. La.
2007).
188. Id. at 686–87 (E.D. La. 2007) (“These pleadings have been lodged in Robinson, et
al. v. United States, in which a Complaint for Damages Caused by the Design, Construction,
Operation and Maintenance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (“MRGO”)1 (Doc. 1) was
filed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. against the
United States of America and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) by
six named plaintiffs living in New Orleans East, St. Bernard Parish, 687 and the Lower Ninth
Ward in Louisiana arising from these areas’ inundation as a consequence of Hurricane
Katrina.”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 677
(E.D. La. 2009) (Robinson), rev’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson
5th Circuit II).
189. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 651–52 (Robinson). By 1962, these levees had
been planned, but construction was not completed until after Hurricane Betsy flooded New
Orleans in 1965.
190. In re Katrina, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
191. Id. at 691.
192. Id. at 694.
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For example, would the United States be immune for all damages if a
Navy vessel lost control and broke through [a] levee where the sole
cause of the failure of that levee was the Navy vessel’s negligence?
Thus, contrary to the Government’s contention that Central Green
broadens the immunity provided by [§] 702c, in reality Central Green
requires the Court to identify the cause of the damage rather than base a
decision on the mere fact that a flood control project was involved.
Central Green does not directly answer the question of what nexus to a
flood control project is required for floodwaters to trigger immunity. 193

The court goes on to say that the instant case is “very much like”
Central Green: “while arguably the immediate cause of the damage was
indeed ‘floodwaters,’ the caus[e] for such floodwaters[‘] force and breadth
[is] alleged to have been the defalcations of the Government with respect to
the MRGO.”194 It does not elaborate on why this case is like Central Green,
whose factual question on remand was the characterization of the waters,
not the defalcations of the Government in regard to the canal in that case.195
By ignoring Central Green’s clear statement that the courts should look to
the “character of the waters”196 and looking instead at the nature of the
damage, the court read the importance of the flood waters out of its § 702c
analysis and denied summary judgment on the § 702c motion. By denying
immunity, the court shifted the focus from the law to the Corps.
4.

17th Street Canal Cases

After rejecting the government’s motion for summary judgment on
FCA immunity in Robinson, the district court turned to 17th Street Canal, a
case dealing with damage claims from the failure of the flood wall on the
17th Street Canal, which is a drainage canal for pumping floodwater out of
the city.197 While called canals, these structures more closely resemble open
aqueducts. The 17th Street Canal starts in the heart of New Orleans, where
the land is down to ten feet below sea level.198 The water in the canal flows
by gravity to Lake Pontchartrain, so the bottom of the canal has to be high
193. Id. at 695.
194. Id. Reading this section of Central Green in light of Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States,
210 F.2d 263, 271 (8th Cir. 1954), one could conclude that the government would be immune
from damages for just such a negligently moored Navy vessel if it was carried through the
levee by flood waters.
195. Central Green Co., 531 U.S. 425, 436 (2001).
196. Id. at 437.
197. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (E.D. La.
2008) (17th Street Canal).
198. RICHARD P. MCCULLOH ET AL., GEOLOGY AND HURRICANE-PROTECTION STRATEGIES
IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA 13, Table 1, LSU (2006), https://www.lsu.edu
/lgs/publications/products/Free_publications/Geo-Hurricane-Protection-StrategiesNO.pdf.
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enough above sea level to slope to the outfall at Lake Pontchartrain and still
be above sea level at the end. The water is pumped from the sump formed
by the subsided land up a pipe into the overhead canal.199 Since the bottom
of the canal has to be above sea level, it will be more than 10 feet above
ground level in the areas that are 10 feet below sea level, and the walls of
the canal will be many feet higher.
The drainage canals are open to the Lake and did not have flood gates
that could be closed during periods of elevated sea level from storms.200
When Hurricane Katrina’s surge raised the level of Lake Pontchartrain
several feet, the water backed up into the canals.201 The pressure caused the
concrete and sheet pile flood wall forming the New Orleans side of the canal
to fail, flooding a large area of the northern part of the city.202
Much of the 17th Street Canal opinion recited the plaintiffs’ detailed
history of the New Orleans hurricane protection plan, which began after
Hurricane Betsy in 1965.203 The plaintiffs presented various theories of
negligence in the design and construction of the levees and flood walls,
including decisions by the Corps to allow dredging near the canal, which
might have weakened it.204 The government moved to dismiss, arguing that
§ 702c grants immunity for any damage caused by flood waters.205
The court reiterated its position from Robinson that Graci is the
controlling law.206 The court made clear that it thought the Corps was
negligent in the design of the hurricane protection system, noting that “the
facts surrounding the [Hurricane Protection Plan] in relation to the outfall
canals is checkered and replete with what appears to be errors in

199. CHRISTINE F. ANDERSEN ET AL., AM. SOC’Y CIV. ENG’RS, THE NEW ORLEANS
HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY: A REPORT 22 (2007),
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/erpreport.pdf.
200. Id. at 619–20. Since rainwater still needs to be pumped out when the lake is high,
expensive pumps would be needed to raise the water over the floodgates and into the lake.
These were added as part of the post-Katrina flood control updates.
201. See generally M. Rajabalinejad et al., Probabilistic Assessment of the Flood Wall at
17th Street Canal, New Orleans, in RISK, RELIABILITY AND SOCIETAL SAFETY 2227 (Terje
Aven & Jan Erik Vinnem eds., 2007), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.189.1579&rep=rep1&type=pdf (advocating a probabilistic method for estimating the
failure of flood defenses).
202. Id.
203. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 619–28 (E.D.
La. 2008) (17th Street Canal).
204. Id. at 628.
205. Id. at 633.
206. Id. at 634 (“This Court has previously rejected the United States’ contention that it is
immune from damages for any floodwater regardless of its source in its ruling on a motion to
dismiss before as seen in Robinson and will continue to do so until otherwise guided by a
higher court.”).
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judgment.”207 It then went on to find that Congress authorized and funded
the Corps’s plan, and that this made it clear that the 17th Street Canal was
solely a flood control structure.208 With both conditions of Graci met for
invoking § 702c immunity, the court had no choice but to grant the motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.209 Nonetheless, the judge expressed disapproval
of the law:
When Congress grants immunity to the “sovereign” and that immunity is
interpreted as it has been by the Supreme Court in James and Central
Green, in essence, the King can do no wrong if the facts of the case
compel the Court to apply that immunity. Here, the Court must apply
this broad immunity based upon the facts of this case. Often, when the
King can do no wrong, his subjects suffer the consequences. Such is the
case here.210

5.

The Discretionary Authority Exception

The Robinson plaintiffs who exhausted their administrative notice
under the FTCA and survived FCA immunity then filed a tort claim against
the Corps, and, pursuant to the FTCA, the United States was substituted for
the Corps as the defendant. Since there is no federal common law of torts,
the FTCA specifies that the tort law of the state where the incident occurred
is used to determine the prima facie case for a claim. 211 There is no jury,
which is consistent with the judicial review of agency adjudications. The
courts use a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than arbitrary
and capricious standard from the Administrative Procedure Act for
reviewing factual decisions by agencies.212 There is no deference to the
agency on the record; the courts try the case like an ordinary tort case, with
207. Id. at 637.
208. Id. at 638. The judge apparently does not believe in discretionary authority,
otherwise the approval of Congress would not be relevant to assessing the Corps’ decision.
209. In re Katrina, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
210. Id. at 638.
211. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992).
212. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 482 (1951) (“(e) Scope of
Review.—So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall . . .
(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of
procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the
requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall
review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. s 1009(e)).
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a de novo review of the facts.213 The deference is manifested through the
statutory discretionary authority exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.214

The clearest limitation of this defense is that the agency cannot decide
to violate applicable statutes or regulations. For example, a regulatory
agency can choose to inspect a sample of regulated airplanes, rather than
inspecting every airplane.215 But if the agency requires that every item be
inspected, as the FDA did with its rule that required testing every batch of
polio vaccine, it cannot do spot-checking. It is not within the discretion of an
agency to violate its own rules, even if the rule was not required by
statute.216
Dalehite v. United States, 217 the first United States Supreme Court
decision to interpret discretionary function defense, was also about a
massive Gulf Coast disaster. Two ships carrying fertilizer to Europe under
the Marshall Plan exploded in the port, destroying the center of Texas City,
Texas, and killing 500 to 600 people.218 The United States was sued for
negligence leading to the explosion.219 The Dalehite court looked to the
extensive legislative history of the FTCA to determine how far Congress
intended to go with the waiver of sovereign immunity. It was clear that a
prime objective was to find a better way to deal with paying damages for
routine vehicle accident damage, which, prior to the FTCA, were paid by
213. Typically, the only record from the agency is a bare denial or a monetary offer, or, in
these cases, no answer at all.
214. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
215. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 820 (1984) (“It follows that the acts of FAA employees in executing the “spotcheck” program in accordance with agency directives are protected by the discretionary
function exception as well.”)
216. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 548 (1988).
217. 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953).
218. GAINES M. FOSTER, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, U.S. ARMY, THE DEMANDS OF
HUMANITY: ARMY MEDICAL DISASTER RELIEF 131 (1983), https://history.army.mil/html/
books/040/40-3/CMH_Pub_40-3.pdf.
219. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953) (“The negligence charged was that the United
States, without definitive investigation of FGAN properties, shipped or permitted shipment to
a congested area without warning of the possibility of explosion under certain conditions.”).
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passing private bills through Congress.220 The “due care” clause clearly
ruled out the negligent operation of a vehicle under state law as subject to
discretion. At the other extreme, Congress did not want to create an avenue
for judicial review of executive policy decisions:
This paragraph characterizes the general exemption as ‘a highly
important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill
might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government
growing out of authorized activity, such as a flood control or irrigation
project, where no negligence on the part of any government agent is
shown, and the only ground for the suit is the contention that the same
conduct by a private individual would be tortious . . . . The bill is not
intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide
a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently
performed and involving an abuse of discretion.’ 221

This paragraph captures the two core ideas of the discretionary function
defense. The first is common senseallowing the judiciary to second guess
executive policy decisions where there is no negligence would fatally
undermine separation of powers. The second, protecting negligent decisions,
is more nuanced. The first reason that negligent decisions should not be
subject to tort claims is that it would provide the courts a way to question all
decisions, because every decision would be fair game for review until it was
found to be non-negligent. The second reason is that decisionmakers should
not be worrying about whether they will be questioned about the
consequences of their actions in court. Even though the United States is
substituted for the individual defendant and pays the damages, the individual
would still have to be deposed and examined as a witness, and what
bureaucrat would want to attract that level of scrutiny of his or her actions?
(One of the ironies of Hurricane Katrina was that it was Mayor Nagin of
New Orleans’s misunderstanding of the legal notion of discretionary
immunity that delayed the evacuation order for New Orleans).222
The Congressional report noted an obvious consequence of this
exception: the same actions protected by the exemption would be actionable
if done by a private person. This is where litigating an FTCA claim diverges
from litigating a private tort action. In private tort actions, the plaintiff wants
to make the defendant appear as culpable as possible to sway the emotions
220. Id. at 28.
221. Id. at 30.
222. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS,
AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 22–23 (Morrow 2006) (“Nagin said late Saturday that he’s
having his legal staff look into whether he can order a mandatory evacuation of the city,”
Bruce Nolan reported in the Times-Picayune, “a step he’s been hesitant to do because of the
potential liability on the part of the city for closing hotels and other businesses.”).
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of the judge or jury, increasing the chance of a verdict for the plaintiff and a
bigger award of damages. The more the plaintiff can show that the
defendant knew about the danger of his actions, the more those actions
appear intentionally harmful, the stronger the plaintiff’s case.223 This same
showing in an FTCA case assures a dismissal.
The next major case, another mass tort case, is Allen.224 In Allen, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) authorized above ground nuclear bomb
testing in Nevada.225 Plaintiffs were exposed to significant radiation from
nuclear fallout and suffered real and ongoing injuries.226 The plaintiffs
proved that the government knowingly chose to do above ground nuclear
weapons testing, knowing it would expose communities downwind to
dangerous nuclear fallout, which did in fact cause injuries.227 The plaintiffs
conceded that these high-level decisions were subject to the discretionary
authority exception.228 Their claim was that the government was negligent in
the lower-level decisions on whether to warn the public and to provide
information about precautions against radiation injury.229
The district court looked to a list of Atomic Energy Commission
recommendations for radiologic risk warnings, mitigation measures, and
monitoring as evidence as setting a standard.230 It claimed it could not find
any explicit decision to not follow these guidelines because of public policy
or national security considerations. 231 It held that it was not whether the
United States had made the decision to use these measures—which it clearly
did since it knew about them and did not use them—but that the government
had not provided some specific policy rational for the decision.232
In dismissing the action under the discretionary function exception, the
appeals court found that the discretionary function exception is strongest
when the government knowingly puts people and property at risk. The
appeals court was clear that this showing did not trigger liability:

223. The only situation where this is not advisable is when the plaintiff is depending on
the defendant’s insurance or a third party to pay the award and the indemnity contract or
policy excludes intentional acts.
224. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) rev’d, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1987).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 257.
227. Id. at 372.
228. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied by Allen
v. United States, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
229. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 338.
230. Id. at 338–39.
231. Id. at 338.
232. Id. at 339. “It is the nature of the specific decision, not the fact that some decision or
choice was made, that is important.”
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It is irrelevant to the discretion issue whether the AEC or its employees
were negligent in failing to adequately protect the public. . . . When the
conduct at issue involves the exercise of discretion by a government
agency or employee, §2680(a) preserves governmental immunity
‘whether or not the discretion involved be abused.’ For better or worse,
plaintiffs here ‘obtain their ‘right to sue from Congress [and] necessarily
must take it subject to such restrictions as have been imposed.’233

The context of Allen and this analysis together provide the clearest
example in the precedent cases of the application of the discretionary
function exception to specific decisions by the government that knowingly
subject people to risk of harm, including death. If the government
recognizes the risk and goes ahead with the action, it is immune under
discretionary function immunity. It does not need to justify this decision,
and there is no question of right or wrong because it is a knowing
engagement of the risk. This is when the FTCA is in starkest contrast to
private tort law.234
6.

The Federal Torts Claims Act Analysis in Graci

Robinson basically relitigates Graci, suing the Corps for hurricane
flooding allegedly caused by the MRGO funneling water into the city and
increasing surge. Since the plaintiffs and the judge in Robinson based their
arguments on Graci, it is instructive to look at what the trial judge in Graci
decided about the plaintiffs’ factual and FTCA claims when he reviewed the
case on remand.235
The Graci court found that under Louisiana law, the United States
would be liable for its acts and negligence, if any, in the construction of the
MRGO to the extent that they caused damages.236 He also found that
Congress authorized the MRGO, that plaintiffs had not shown that the Corps
deviated from the project Congress envisioned, and that the plaintiffs did not
show any negligence in the “design, construction or functioning of said
project.”237
These findings are relevant to Robinson, because the plaintiffs in
Robinson allege that design decisions made in the 1950s, prior to Graci,
showed that the Corps knew that the banks of the MRGO should have been

233. Allen, 816 F.2d at 1421–22 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31
(1953)).
234. It is ironic that Allen is not cited in any of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, despite
being the most on point precedent on discretionary authority.
235. Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. La. 1977).
236. Id. at 195–96 (noting that the MRGO had no effect on the flooding).
237. Id. at 196.
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armored.238 This argument is then bolstered by references to a 1963 report
from the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors that also called for
riprap (i.e., rock used to armor the shoreline) along the MRGO.239 The court
concludes that this is evidence that the negligent failure to use riprap was
associated with the MRGO, and not with the flood control plan.240 Yet if
these decisions were adjudged proper at the time they were made, it is hard
to say that they were outside the Corps’s discretion in subsequent litigation.
Most importantly, the Graci court finding that causation failed:
27. Hurricane Betsy, while unusually ferocious, was not the only
hurricane to produce flooding in the areas occupied by plaintiffs’
property. Since 1900, 88 hurricanes and tropical storms have traversed
through or by the Louisiana coast. Three of these, in 1915, 1947, and
1956, prior to the construction of the MRGO, produced flooding similar
to that experienced in Hurricane Betsy . . . . Within the inundated areas
are those occupied by plaintiffs’ properties.
28. While the damage caused by Hurricane Betsy was far more severe
than that occasioned during prior hurricanes, the severity and track of
Hurricane Betsy are responsible therefor as opposed to any man-made
construction such as the MRGO. Betsy was so severe that all the
Louisiana coastal lowlands experienced some inundation and following
Betsy’s occurrence the scientific parameters for calculating hurricane
protection were, of necessity, recomputed.241

The Graci court recognized the reality of hurricanes in southern
Louisiana. The area flooded by Hurricane Betsy had flooded many times
before the MRGO was built and the cypress forests disappeared. The court
accepted the scientific findings that the MRGO was too small to affect surge
in major hurricanes.242 In the forty years after Hurricane Betsy, the area
continues to subside, and sea level has increased, with relative sea level rise
constantly increasing the flooding risk.

238. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 654 (E.D. La.
2009) (Robinson).
239. Id. at 656.
240. Graci, 435 F. Supp. at 195–96.
241. Id. at 193.
242. CHARLES L. BRETSCHNEIDER & J. IAN COLLINS, STORM SURGE EFFECTS OF THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER-GULF OUTLET: STUDY A (National Engineering Science Company) (1966)
(“It is seen that the effect of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet is almost negligible for all
large hurricanes accompanied by slow rising storm surges. It may be expected that once in a
while a storm may occur which has a somewhat freakish. more rapidly rising surge in which
case the Gulf Outlet Channel may have a very marked effect. However, such a storm will not
produce tides which are as high as the more critical hurricane tracks such as Betsy or the
synthetic hurricanes.”).
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The Robinson Trial

We now return to Robinson, which went to trial following the court’s
decision in 17th Street Canal.243 Recall that the Robinson court rejected the
government’s motion to dismiss under FCA immunity, comparing the
hurricane to a Navy vessel as the phantom levee breaker, an analogy that
persists throughout the judge’s arguments.244 The district judge began by
noting that nothing he had seen in all the motions and evidence before the
court in the two years since the hearing for the motion to dismiss changed
his reading of Graci and Central Green.245
The court then provided a history of the MRGO and the Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan (LVP), the plan set in
motion by Congress in 1955 after a series of hurricanes flooded New
Orleans.246 The presentation of this history reads like a traditional tort case
against a private party:
Buried in various Corps’ reports some of which are discussed, infra, are
unequivocal, positive statements that underscore the Corps’ knowledge
that the MRGO would not be a static, unchanging waterway. It was clear
from its inception that because of its location, degradation of the area
would result unless proper, prophylactic measures were taken. In fact,
some measures were included in the Corps’ plans; they simply were not
implemented in time to prevent immense environmental destruction.247

There are additional allegations about how the widening of the MRGO
through wave action threatened the flood control levees outside the
MRGO.248 The plaintiffs also argued that the improper maintenance of the
MRGO and its subsequent widening required the Corps to file a
supplementary environmental impact statement. In sum, the plaintiffs’ case
is that the Corps ignored the threat that the MRGO posed to the flood
control levees, and that it was the MRGO that caused the levee failure. The
Corps had notice and knowledge of the risk and made a decision not to act
on the knowledge. 249
243. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (Robinson).
244. See, e.g., id. at 692; see also supra text accompanying note 194.
245. See In Re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (Robinson) (introducing the earlier
reading of the two cases and beginning the analysis where the earlier opinion left off).
246. Id. at 649–53. For much of the history, the court relies on a Corps report: DOUGLAS
WOOLLEY & LEONARD SHABMAN, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION-MAKING
CHRONOLOGY FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN & VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT
(Mar. 2008), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/hpdc/Final_HPDC_Apr3_2008.pdf.
247. Id. at 653.
248. Id. at 697–98.
249. See id. at 666 (“As to the north shore, the callous and/or myopic approach of the
Corps to the obvious deleterious nature of the MRGO is beyond understanding.”).
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The judge then proceeds to transform Hurricane Katrina’s flood waters
into his Navy vessel. He sees a major problem with the Corps’s failure to
armor the sides of the MRGO with rock to prevent erosion and widening.250
While the decision whether to armor a channel to protect a flood control
levee would seem to fall directly under § 702c, in this court’s view that
decision was part of the (nonimmune) decision-making about the
navigational aspects of the MRGO. In response to the government’s
evidence that the levee failed and was overtopped because it was not
constructed at the design height, a pure § 702c decision, the court responded
that if “the Navy vessel ran into a papier mâché levee, the vessel would still
be a substantial factor in the damage.”251
The court concluded that the failure to prevent the natural widening of
the MRGO hastened the destruction of the flood control levee during the
hurricane.252 Thus, the negligence in maintaining the MRGO becomes the
equivalent of negligently mooring a Navy vessel.253 The Navy vesselmade
of the Hurricane Katrina storm surgethen breaches the flood control
levees. In the court’s view, the negligence in maintaining the MRGO is not
superseded by § 702c immunity.254
The FTCA discretionary authority defense was disposed of by finding
that the Corps violated various questionable duties. These include a duty to
ask Congress for money255 and a failure to properly assess the MRGO’s
risks to wetlands in a 1976 environmental impact statement under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 256 The court ignores the pages
250. See id. at 697 (“This Court is utterly convinced that the Corps’ failure to provide
timely foreshore protection doomed the channel to grow to two to three times its design width
and destroyed the banks which would have helped to protect the Reach 2 Levee from frontside wave attack as well as loss of height.”).
251. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 692 (E.D. La.
2009) (Robinson).
252. Id. at 697–98.
253. Id. at 698 (“The Corps’ ‘Navy vessel’ devastated this levee.”).
254. Thus, the Corps’ decisions were made in the context of the MRGO project, not
within the context of the LPV. None of these decisions directly concerned the LPV or its
construction. Foreshore protection and addressing salinity issues had to do with wave wash
that was causing severe erosion of the banks of the MRGO and led to an exponential growth
of the channel far beyond that which was approved by Congress. Thus, the failures at issue
here are extrinsic to the LPV and are not subject to § 702c immunity. Id. at 699.
255. Id. at 663 (“Never was any direct funding approach taken even when the Corps knew
it had triggered catastrophic erosion caused by the very channel it had created.”).
256. Id. at 725 (“Plaintiffs have presented substantial, clear and convincing evidence
outlined above that the Corps itself internally recognized that the MRGO was causing
significant changes in the environment—that is the disappearance of the adjacent wetlands to
the MRGO and the effects thereof on the human environment—which triggered reporting
requirements. The Corps cannot ignore the dictates of NEPA and then claim the protection of
the discretionary exception based on its own apparent self-deception.”).
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of evidence that the Corps knowingly and intentionally weighed the facts
and chose its course of action.257 None of these alleged breaches of duty is
relevant to the Corps’s authority. Allen tells us that such knowing behavior
is the strongest proof of discretionary action, yet Allen is never mentioned in
this case.258
a.

Robinsonthe Fifth Circuit Round I

The case was appealed, and after oral argument, the appeals court
rendered its first opinion, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.259 This
opinion basically tracked the district court’s opinion, finding no § 702c Act
immunity other than for the 17th Street cases and for the NEPA claims.260 It
accepted the finding that the Corps was negligent in its decisions about
maintaining MRGO, and that this negligence was the cause of the levee
failures and plaintiffs’ damages. As with the district court case, this
negligence was based on a showing that the Corps was aware of the erosion
of MRGO and that this erosion led to the failure of the flood control levees
between MRGO and the plaintiffs.261
b.

Robinsonthe Fifth Circuit Round II

Six months later, the same panel of the court withdrew its opinion in
response to a petition for rehearing and substituted a new opinion, In re

257. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (Robinson) (“Plaintiffs respond that the
Corps’s [sic] defalcations with respect to the maintenance and operation of the MRGO were
in direct contravention of professional engineering and safety standards and thus the Corps is
prohibited from seeking protection from this exception. Ignoring safety and poor engineering
are not policy, and clearly the Corps engaged in such activities. The Court finds the latter
argument more compelling in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.”).
258. Inexplicably, the government did not mention Allen in its brief on appeal, and it does
not appear in the 17th Street opinion, so Judge Duval can perhaps be forgiven for not
addressing it in this opinion. Id. at 705.
259. 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit I), opinion withdrawn on reh’g,
696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II).
260. Id at 393. (“NEPA’s procedural mandates require agencies to inform their discretion
in decisionmaking. An agency that complies with NEPA gives outside influences (the public,
lawmakers, other agencies) more information with which to put pressure on that agency, but
the original agency retains substantive decisionmaking power regardless. At most, the Corps
has abused its discretion—an abuse explicitly immunized by the DFE.”).
261. Id. at 399 (“The district court’s careful attention to the law and even more cautious
scrutiny of complex facts allow us to uphold its expansive ruling in full, excepting our minor
restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments in Robinson and
Anderson, leaving each party as he was before this appeal. Similarly, we DENY the
government’s petition for a writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial.”) (footnote
omitted).
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Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.262 The court still accepted the district
court’s rejection of § 702c immunity:
Thus, after Central Green, waters have the immune character of “flood
waters” if the government’s link to the waters is through flood-control
activity. That is to say, the government’s acting upon waters for the
purpose of flood control is flood-control activity, and flood-control
activity is what gives waters an immune “character.” We therefore reject
the government’s interpretation of the scope of Section 702c and
conclude, instead, that the United States enjoys immunity under that
section only where damages result from waters released by flood-control
activity or negligence therein.263

This appears to conflict with the “character of the waters” test from
Central Green.264 The panel’s substitute opinion revises its analysis of the
discretionary function exception from the FTCA as applied to the critical
question of whether the Corps’s decision to not armor the MRGO to prevent
erosion was analogous to an error in a scientific calculation.265 The court
recognizes that while the decisions do include scientific calculations, if they
also evidence policy considerations then they are immune under the
discretionary authority exception.266
Recognizing that the discretionary function exception does not require
the Government to make the “right” decision is an important change in the
court’s position. The district court focused on what the Corps knew about
the risks of flooding to New Orleans. It treated this as guilty knowledge that
demanded action, as if the Corps was a private tortfeasor knowingly putting
its victims at risk. But the government is charged with making political
decisions about risk in what are often zero-sum situations.
While not citing Allen, the new opinion is consistent with its reasoning:
if the government is making a policy choice that is otherwise allowed by
law, it is protected by the discretionary function exception. The government
does not need to explore all possible risks and alternatives that might put
262. 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II), cert. denied, Lattimore v.
United States, 570 U.S. 926 (2013).
263. Id. at 446.
264. See Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001)
265. BRETSCHNEIDER & COLLINS, supra note 243 and accompanying text.
266. In Re Katrina, 696 F.3d at 451 (Robinson 5th Circuit II) (“Although the Corps
appears to have appreciated the benefit of foreshore protection as early as 1967, the record
shows that it also had reason to consider alternatives (such as dredging and levee “lifts”) and
feasibility before committing to an armoring strategy that, in hindsight, may well have been
optimal. The Corps’s actual reasons for the delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but
there can be little dispute that the decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations.
Whatever the actual reasons for the delay, the Corps’s failure to armor timely Reach 2 is
shielded by the DFE.”).
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fewer people at risk. If the government’s decision results in injuries, the
proper remedy is compensation through the political process, not litigation.
The court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims in Robinson and in the related
cases.267
III. CONCLUSION
Even though the Robinson ruling did not stand, its reading of Central
Green still stands and undermines § 702c immunity in the Fifth Circuit. This
leaves the courts free to second guess the Corps for every failed levee or
decision to not build a levee. While the discretionary authority exception is a
powerful defense, as this case and others demonstrate, that will only come
years after a hugely expensive litigation process and trial. In the process,
plaintiffs can use the courts to undermine belief in the risks of climate
change, attributing the damages from inherent geologic risk and sea level
rise to bad planning by the Corps.
These cases fuel the national myth that New Orleans would have been
fine but for the failures of the Corps. That myth is based on a steady state
earth. It has driven tens of billions of dollars in new levee construction
premised on the belief that the problem is bad levees and not an everincreasing threat from subsidence and global warming-driven sea level rise.
The steady state earth model also includes the redemption myth: if the Corps
broke it, the Corps can fix it. This is already embodied in the Corps’s
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Ecosystem Restoration Plan, a $3 billion plan
which depends on a steady state earth to succeed.268
The United States has tens of millions of people and trillions of dollars
of infrastructure at risk from global warming-driven sea level rise, or the
combination of sea level rise and subsidence. On the Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts, hurricanes transform the risk of slow immersion into the existential
risk of catastrophic hurricane damages. Despite the ultimate failure of all of
the Hurricane Katrina claims against the federal government, the steady
state earth view of the Robinson trial court has been accepted as the true
267. This included a group of cases refiled under admiralty law after being dismissed as
FTCA claims: “Here, the appellants seek to distinguish their claims, now pled under the Suits
in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), 46 U.S.C. § 30901 et seq., the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”), 46
U.S.C. § 31101 et seq., and the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101
et seq., on the theory that by dredging with a method called box-cutting, the government
acted negligently and violated various federal and state statutes and regulations. We are not
persuaded and affirm the judgment. The decision on the method of dredging is shielded by
the discretionary function exception.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. v. United States
616 F. App’x 659, 660 (5th Cir. 2015).
268. Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) Ecosystem Restoration, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS,
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Environmental/MRGOEcosystem
Restoration.aspx.
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story of Hurricane Katrina.269 The New Orleans levees have been rebuilt but
the core threat of climate change and delta geology has not changed.
Blaming the Corps will not keep New Orleans safe from flooding. It will
only distract us from the real threats facing New Orleans and every other
low lying coastal city.

269. The Federal Circuit did raise the issue of the government evidence on the limited
impact of the MRGO. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).

